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Abstract
Following the structure of many commodity markets, we consider a reduced number of
large firms and a competitive fringe of many small suppliers choosing quantities in an infinite-
horizon setting subject to demand shocks. We show that a collusive agreement among the
large firms may not only bring an output contraction but also an output expansion (relative
to the non-collusive output level). The latter occurs during booms, when the fringe’s market
share is more important, and is due to the strategic substitutability of quantities (we will
never observe an output-expanding collusion in a price-setting game). In addition and
depending on the fringe’s market share the time at which collusion is most diﬃcult to
sustain can be either at booms or recessions.
1 Introduction
In Table 1 we reproduce Orris C. Herfindahl’s Table 3 (1959, p. 115) with a summary of the
evolution of the so-called international copper cartel that consisted of the five largest firms and
operated during the four years preceding the Second World War. Herfindahl argues that the
cartel was successful in restricting output during the periods of low demand (denoted as Quota
status and associated to lower spot prices in the London Metal Exchange) but failed to extend
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such restrictions to the periods of high demand when the cartel and non-cartel firms returned
to their non-collusive output levels.1
Herfindahl’s description appears consistent with some existing collusion theories; in par-
ticular, with Rotemberg and Saloner’s (1986) prediction for the evolution of a cartel under
conditions of demand fluctuations in that collusive firms have more diﬃculties in sustaining
collusion during booms (i.e., periods of high demand).2 We advance a diﬀerent behavioral
hypothesis in this paper. We posit that the large output expansions undertaken by cartel mem-
bers during the two booms (Jan.—Nov. 1937 and Oct.—Dec. 1938) may not necessarily reflect
a return to the non-collusive (i.e., Nash-Cournot) equilibrium but rather a continuation with
the collusive agreement in the form of a coordinated output expansion of cartel members above
their Nash-Cournot levels.3
The objective of this paper is to explore the conditions under which a collusive agreement,
if sustained, can take an output-expanding form at least during some part of the business cycle
and discuss its welfare implications. Although we do not run any empirical test, we will see
that the international copper cartel of 1935-39, as well as many of today’s commodity markets,
appear to be good candidates in which this is likely to happen for basically two reasons. First,
in these markets a firm’ strategic variable is its level of production while prices are cleared,
say, in a metal exchange. And second, collusive eﬀorts, if any, are likely to be carried out
by a fraction of the industry (typically, the largest firms) leaving, for incentive compatibility
reasons, an important fraction of the industry (consisting mostly of a large number of small
firms) outside the collusive agreement but nevertheless enjoying any eventual price increase
brought forward by the collusive agreement (we will often refer to the group of non-cartel firms
as competitive fringe and to the group of potential cartel firms as strategic or large firms).4
It is important to make clear that the possibility of having an output-expanding collusion,
and hence, lower prices, is totally unrelated to this idea that a cartel should prevent prices
1Walters (1944) also comments on the satisfactory operation of the cartel in that there is no indication that
sanctions for non-compliance were ever invoked.
2Rotemberg and Saloner’s (1986) prediction can change if we introduce imperfect monitoring (Green and
Porter, 1984), a less than fully random demand evolution (Haltinwager and Harrington, 1991; Bagwell and
Staiger, 1997), and capacity contraints (Staiger and Wolak, 1992).
3That collusion could lead to higher ouput, and hence, increase welfare was first articulated by Dewey (1979)
but for reasons very diﬀerent than ours. His logic, however, was highly controversial as noted by several authors
in a later issue of the American Economic Review (1982, Vol. 1).
4Although the collusion literature usually assumes a structure of identical firms, this heterogenous structure
in which a few large firms compete with many smaller firms has long been recognized (Arant, 1956; Pindyck,
1979).
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going too high as to induce the development of a substitute product (or the discovery of new
mineral deposits) that can eat up a fraction of the current demand. Besides that this can be
easily added to our model by including a probability of discovery increasing in prices (more
reasonably perhaps, in the average price of some period of time), our model is constructed
simply upon the presence of a known fringe of small suppliers that run and shut down their
production units so at all moment the unit-cost of the marginal fringe firm is equal to the
equilibrium price. In addition and consistent with practical observation, we assume that the
entry or exit of large firms is a rare event.
Our results are entirely explained by market-interaction forces among existing players. To
see this consider the evolution of the non-collusive (Nash-Cournot) equilibrium in a market
subject to frequent demand shocks. As expressed to us by some observers/participants of
the copper industry, the (non-collusive) market share of fringe firms typically expands during
booms and contracts during recessions. In other words, a large firm’s unilateral best response
is to limit its own expansion during booms. As a consequence and because of the strategic
sustitutability between the output of fringe firms and that of large firms (Bulow et al., 1985;
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984), it may be optimal for the large firms to coordinate in a joint
output expansion beyond their Nash-Cournot levels. The price drop caused by the strategic
firms’ output expansion is more than oﬀset by their market share increase.
Whether or not it is optimal for the large firms to implement such an output-expanding
collusion as opposed to a traditional output-contracting collusion will ultimately depend on the
fringe’s (non-collusive) market share, which in turn, will depend on cost diﬀerences between
large and fringe firms and on the magnitude of the demand shocks. One can always find
fringe costs suﬃciently low (high) that it is optimal for strategic firms to implement an output-
expanding (-contracting) collusion for all possible realizations of demand. As we speculate
for the copper cartel of 1935-39, however, the more interesting case is that in which fringe
costs generate both output-expanding collusion during booms and output-contracting collusion
during recessions.
One way to appreciate these results more fully it is to contrast them with those obtained
from a price-setting game for diﬀerentiated products.5 Think, for example, of a conventional
Hotelling linear city in which there are two large supermarkets in each extreme of the city and
a large number of small stores located downtown (i.e., in the middle of the city) competing
5 If products are perfectly homogeneous it is immediate that we can never have an output-expanding collusion.
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in prices.6 Following the arguments above, one could conjecture that for a fringe suﬃciently
eﬃcient that enjoys a large market share it may be optimal for the two supermarkets to co-
ordinate on jointly pricing below their non-collusive (Nash-Bertrand) levels and expand their
market share accordingly. It turns out this is never the case and the reason is the strategic
complementarity between prices charged by the strategic firms and by the fringe firms. If large
firms lower their prices, fringe firms’ equilibrium response is to lower theirs.
The presence of an important fraction of non-cartel firms has also implications for cartel
firms’ ability to sustain the collusive outcome throughout the business cycle. Using the same
i.i.d. demand shocks of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), we show that it is no longer true that
is more diﬃcult for firms to sustain maximal collusion during booms than during recessions.
Depending on fringe’s costs relative to large firms’ and on the possible realizations of demand,
there will be cases in which it is more diﬃcult for firms to sustain (maximal) collusion during
periods of low demand.
Because many commodity markets are characterized by the presence of a relatively large
fraction of small suppliers that will never enter into a collusive agreement, our results have
important policy implications. We cannot rule out, on theoretical grounds, that collusion
eﬀorts by a group of large firms may be welfare enhancing when periods of output-contracting
collusion are followed by periods of output-expanding collusion.7 Based on the aggregate data
of Table 1, we illustrate this possibility in a numerical exercise for the copper cartel of 1935-39.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section (Section 2) we present
the model and derive the Nash-Cournot equilibrium. In Section 3 we present the maximal
collusive equilibrium and demonstrate the possibility of an output-expanding collusion (we also
demonstrate that the latter is never the case in a price-setting game). To illustrate this result a
bit further, we simplify our model to establish the conditions for an output-expanding collusion
in terms of (non-collusive) market shares. In Section 4, we study the cartel stability along the
business cycle. The numerical welfare exercise based on the copper cartel data is in Section 5.
6Note that in equilibrium all fringe firms that are called to produce charge the same price which is equal to
the unit-cost of the marginal fringe firm.
7 It is interesting to contrast these observations with recent events in the copper industry. Back in 2001 when
prices were at record low, the three largest firms in the industry made fairly simultaneous announcements of
supply restrictions (either as lower production or inventory holdings) that were eventually carried out. Today,
prices are at record high and some of the same firms are announcing very aggressive expansion plans. Obviously,
in the absence of a more detailed empirical analysis we cannot tell whether these firms are engaged in some sort
of tacit collusion or are rather optimally adjusting their supplies (including capacities and inventories) as they
move from one non-collusive equilibrium to another. Nevertheless, this paper should prove useful in structuring
such an empirical test.
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Concluding remarks follow.
2 Oligopoly-fringe model
2.1 Notation
A group of n identical (strategic) firms (i = 1, ..., n) and a competitive fringe consisting of a
continuum of firms (indexed by j) produce some commodity in an infinite-horizon setting. At
the beginning of each period, firms simultaneously choose their production levels and the price
is cleared (in a metal exchange) according to the inverse demand curve P (θ,Q) = θP (Q) with
P 0(Q) < 0, where Q is total production and θ ∈ [θ, θ] is a demand shock which is observed by
all firms before they engage in production.8 Strictly speaking, only the n strategic firms have
the possibility of choosing among diﬀerent production levels; a fringe firm’s decision is simply
whether or not to bring its unit of output to the market.9
The production cost of each strategic firm is Cs(qs) with C 0s(qs) > 0 and C 00s (qs) ≥ 0 ("s"
stands for strategic firm). The unit cost of fringe firm j is cj . The cj ’s, which vary across firms,
can be cost-eﬀectively arranged along a marginal cost curve C0f (Qf ) with C00f (Qf ) > 0, where
Qf =
R
qfjdj is fringe firms’ output (we will use capital letters to denote group production and
small letters to denote individual production, so strategic firms’ output is Qs =
Pn
i=1 qsi and
total output is Q = Qs +Qf ).
In several passages of the paper we will introduce, without much loss of generality, some
simplifying assumptions to our model in order to work with closed-form solutions that convey
the intuition in a simpler way. In particular, we will assume that P (Q) = a− bQ, that strategic
firms have no production costs and that the fringe’ aggregate marginal cost curve is C 0f (Qf ) =
cQf , where a, b and c are strictly positive parameters.10
8We consider multiplicative demand shocks (see also Green and Porter, 1984) instead of additive demand
shocks mainly because they better capture the observation that (non-collusive) fringe’s market share generally
expands during booms and contracts during recesions. See also Turnovsky (1976) for a technical discussion.
9Note that in most commodity markets firms make (simultaneous) production decisions largely based on what
they expect prices to be in the next periods. A good example is Salant’s (1976) pioneer model for the oil market.
Assuming otherwise that within each period the n strategic firms move first than fringe firms would require
cooperation among the strategic firms because nothing prevent any of them from moving again together with
the fringe. More importantly, we see no technical reasons for a sequential move, especially if in practice some of
the fringe firms would be not much smaller than some of the strategic firms. Including some fringe firms with
output flexibility complicates the algebra with no implications in the results. It would be interesting, however,
to study more formally the process of cartel formation when there are heterogenous firms.
10That the costs of large firms are, on average, lower than the costs of smaller firms is not a bad assumption
–at least for mineral markets (Crowson, 2003). However, we do not need such assumption for our results and
we only use it for mathematical tractability.
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2.2 The (non-collusive) Nash-Cournot equilibrium
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium of the one-period (simultaneous-move) game, i.e., the equilib-
rium in the absence of any collusion eﬀorts, is found by solving each firm’s problem
max
qsi
θP (qsi +
P
j 6=i
qsj +Qf )qsi − Cs(qsi) for all i = 1, ..., n (1)
qfj =



1 if cj ≤ θP (Qs +Qf )
0 if cj > θP (Qs +Qf )
for all j (2)
The n first-order conditions associated to (1) give us the best-response of each strategic firm to
the play of all remaining firms. Similarly, (2) summarizes the best-response of each fringe firm,
which is to produce as long as its unit cost is equal or below the clearing price.
Given the symmetry of the problem, the equilibrium outcome of the one-period game is
given by
θP 0(Qnc)Qncs /n+ θP (Qnc)− C 0s(Qncs /n) = 0 (3)
θP (Qnc) = C 0f (Qncf ) (4)
where "nc" stands for Nash-Cournot or non-collusive equilibrium and Qnc = Qncs +Qncf . Solving
we obtain Qncs (θ) and Qncf (θ).11
3 Collusive equilibria
It is well known that in a infinite-horizon setting strategic firms may be able to sustain out-
comes in subgame perfect equilibrium that generate higher profits than the outcome in the
corresponding one-period game. Leaving for later discussion how easy or diﬃcult is for firms
to sustain these collusive outcomes in equilibrium, or alternatively, assuming for the moment
that the discount factor δ (of strategic firms) is close enough to one,12 in this section we are
interested in finding the best collusive agreement for the strategic firms.
11The corresponding quantities for the simplified model are
Qncs =
nac
b[c(n+ 1) + θb] and Q
nc
f =
θa
c(n+ 1) + θb
It is immediately seen that ∂Qncs (θ)/∂θ < 0 and ∂Qncf (θ)/∂θ > 0.
12The discount factor of fringe firms is irrelevant since they always operate along their static best-response
function.
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A natural point of departure in this simultaneous-move game is to compute what we call
the static monopoly outcome that results from taking the group of large firms as a single player
playing a one-period game against the fringe. The equilibrium is obtained from intersecting
the static reaction (best-response) function of the group of fringe firms with the "static best-
response function" of the group of large firms. Based on the works of Fudenberg and Levine
(1989) and Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin (1990) on repeated games with long-run and short-
run players,13 one might argue that the static monopoly outcome is the best collusive agreement
attainable for the group of large firms if fringe firms are thought to be short-run players that
play only once and in addition have no means to learn about previous play. However, this is a
poor characterization of smaller firms in most commodity markets. As explained by Crowson
(1999), it is common in mineral markets to see smaller firms staying around for as long as
larger firms. It is also the case that smaller firms can learn about previous play without being
physically present, either through word-of-mouth or more likely from written sources.
More importantly, when fringe firms observe previous play it is intuitive that the group of
large firms can strictly improve upon the static monopoly outcome by following (equilibrium)
strategies that are dependent on the possible histories of the game. In other words, the expec-
tations of fringe firms as to what the large firms will produce are now sensitive to previous play
of large firms which in turn allows the group of large firms to credibly communicate its com-
mitment to (profitably) depart from the static monopoly outcome.14 We will refer to the most
preferred of these dynamic outcomes as the maximal collusive agreement. Before describing its
properties, we will present the static monopoly outcome because it will help us to more easily
convey the intuition behind our main result.
13Fudenberg and Levine (1989) is not strictly a supergame as Fudenberg et al.(1990) and ours. They consider
a single long-run player and introduce a bit of uncertainty about its type. It does not seem straightforward
to us how to extend this incomplete information approach to the case of many long-run players each of them
attempting to build reputation.
14Unlike in Fudenberg and Levine (1989) where there is a single long-run player, here we have two or more
large firms which allow them by the threat of falling into a price war, as in Gul (1987) for the durable-good
duopolists, to build commitment despite fringe firms do not observe previous play. This would require, however,
to impose fixed beliefs as to what fringe firms expected large firms to produce in each period. It is more natural
for us to think that fringe firms’ beliefs are not (exogenously) fixed but rather sensitive to past play.
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3.1 Static monopoly outcome
The static best-response function of fringe firms,15 which we denote by the aggregate function
Q∗f (Qs), is implicitly given by θP (Qf + Qs) = C 0f (Qf ). On the other hand, the static best-
response function of the group/cartel of large firms to an aggregate play of Qf by the fringe
firms is given by
Q∗s(Qf ) = argmaxQs
{θP (Qs +Qf )Qs − nCs(Qs/n)}
Given a discount factor close enough to one, the stability of the cartel of large firms is subgame
perfect and it is assumed here that this is correctly anticipated by fringe firms. Hence, the
static monopoly outcome is obtained from the intersection of Q∗f (Qs) and Q∗s(Qf ). Denoting
by Q0s and Q0f the corresponding equilibrium quantities, we have
θP 0(Q0)Q0s + θP (Q0)− C 0s(Q0s/n) = 0 (5)
θP (Q0) = C 0f (Q0f ) (6)
where Q0 = Q0s + Q0f .16 Solving we obtain the static-monopoly equilibrium quantities Q0s(θ)
and Q0f (θ).17
By comparing equilibrium conditions (3)—(4) with (5)—(6), it holds that
Lemma 1 Q0s(θ) < Qncs (θ) and P (Q0(θ)) > P (Qnc(θ)) for all θ.
Proof. Straightforward since P 0(Q) < 0 and n ≥ 2.
This is the conventional view regarding the operation of a cartel in that it always reduces
output to lift prices. In the presence of a competitive fringe there is a caveat, however. When
the fringe’s market share is large enough, it may be optimal for the large firms to stick to the
non-collusive equilibrium (and fringe firms can anticipate that). From conventional monopoly
15Note that since fringe firms are infinitesimally small they always play along their static best-response curve
regardless of their life horizon.
16We have not been explicit about what happens when a large firm deviates from the (collusive) equilibrium
path. A reasonable (subgame perfect) punishment path is a return to Nash-Cournot but with fringe firms playing,
on aggregate, Q0f (not Qncf ). This is because in this "one-shot game" fringe firms’ beliefs are fixed in that they
expect the large group to always play Q0s. There are no deviations in equilibrium, however.
17For the simplified model these quantities are
Q0s =
ac
b(2c+ θb) and Q
0
f =
θa
2c+ θb
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theory, we would say that in such cases large firms do not want to restrict output any further
because they face a (residual) demand that is too elastic. Unfortunately, this result cannot be
easily seen from eqs. (3)—(6) since we need to compute profit levels. Introducing our simplifying
assumptions we can compute π0s and πncs –strategic firm’s profits under static monopoly and
Nash-Cournot, respectively– and obtain18
Lemma 2 π0s(θ) > πncs (θ)⇐⇒ θ < (
√
n− 1)c/b ≡ θ˜
Since fringe’s market share increases with θ (see footnote 11), Lemma 2 states that for
demand shocks suﬃciently large it is optimal for large firms to follow Nash-Cournot strategies.
Note that the smaller the value of c and/or n the smaller the range of θ’s where large firms
want to collude, i.e., where θ < θ˜ holds. The reason is that large firms’ (non-collusive) market
share is increasing in n and c.19
Notice that the evolution of the equilibrium as a function of the demand shock θ is consistent
with Herfindahl’s description of the copper cartel of 1935-39. For θ < θ˜ (and provided that any
collusive outcome benefits both large and fringe firms) firms play the static-monopoly quantities
Q0f (θ) and Q0s(θ) and for θ > θ˜ they return to the Nash-Cournot quantities Qncf (θ) and Qncs (θ).20
3.2 Maximal collusion
Assuming that all players acting at date t have observed the history of play up to date t, it is
possible to construct history-dependent strategy profiles with payoﬀs for the large firms that
are strictly higher than those under the static monopoly outcome. While the latter is one
of the multiple possible equilibria in this repeated game, here we are interested in finding the
maximal collusive agreement, that is, the one that gives large firms the highest attainable payoﬀ
for a discount factor close enough to one. Let Qms and Qmf denote the (aggregate) quantities
corresponding to the maximal collusive equilibrium.21
18The profits for the simplified model are
πncs =
θ
b
·
ac
c(n+ 1) + θb
¸2
and π0s =
θ
nb
·
ac
2c+ θb
¸2
19That large firms may find it optimal to remain at their Nash-Cournot levels is not unique to the quantity
competition assumption. In fact, in the Hotelling-city example of the introduction the Nash-Bestrand prices and
the static monopoly prices are the same.
20 If the discount factor is not high enough for large firms to sustain Q0s(θ), the collusive equilibrium is the one
that implements the most profitable incentive-compatible collusive outcome.
21For the implementation of the maximal collusive agreement consider, for example, the following set of
(symmetric) trigger strategies (which depend on the realization of θ): In period 0, strategic firm i plays Qms /n
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Since strategic firms are symmetric and there are no economies of scale, it is optimal for
each strategic firm to produce qmsi = Qms /n, hence
Qms = argmaxQs
{θP (Qs +Qf (Qs))Qs − nCs(Qs/n)} (7)
where Qf (Qs) is the fringe’s equilibrium response to Qs, which is implicitly given by
θP (Qf +Qs) = C 0f (Qf ) (8)
Replacing Qf (Qs) from (8) into (7), the strategic firms’ maximal collusive outcome solves
C 00f (Qmf )θP 0(Qm)
C 00f (Qmf )− θP 0(Qm)
Qms + θP (Qm)− C 0s(Qms /n) = 0 (9)
θP (Qm) = C 0f (Qmf ) (10)
where Qm = Qms +Qmf . Solving we obtain Qms (θ) and Qmf (θ).22
Note that having Qf as a function of Qs in (7) resembles a Stackelberg (static) game but
it is only because in this repeated game large firms anticipate and use fringe firms’ equilibrium
response in constructing its optimal action and not because some first-mover advantage. By
comparing equilibrium conditions (3)—(4) with (9)—(10) we can establish
Proposition 1 There is a level of demand θˆ for which Qm(θˆ) = Qnc(θˆ) ≡ Qˆ(θˆ) [and Qmf (θˆ) =
Qncf (θˆ) ≡ Qˆf (θˆ)]. This (unique) level of demand is found by replacing the definitions of Qˆ(θˆ)
and Qˆf (θˆ) into θˆ = −(n − 1)C 00f (Qˆf (θˆ))/P 0(Qˆ(θˆ)) and solving. In addition, if θ is greater
(lower) than θˆ, then Qm is greater (lower) than Qnc.
Proof. The first part is straightforward. For Qm = Qnc we need C 00f (·)θP 0(·)/(C 00f (·) −
θP 0(·)) = θP 0(·)/n which rearranged leads to θ = −(n − 1)C 00f (·)/P 0(·). For the second part,
note that if we are at θ = θˆ and let it go up by a marginal amount the term C 00f θP 0/(C00f − θP 0)
in (9) suﬀers a smaller (first-order) decrease (recall that P 0 < 0) than the term θP 0/n in (3).
and fringe firms play, on aggregate, Qmf . In period t, firm i plays Qms /n if in every period preceding t all strategic
firms have played Qms /n; otherwise it plays Qncs /n. Fringe firms, on the other hand, play Qmf in t if in every
period preceding t all strategic firms have played Qms /n; otherwise they play Qncf .
22For the simplified model these quantities are
Qms =
a
2b and Q
m
f =
θa
2(c+ θb)
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Consequently, Qms must be somehow larger than Qncs (and, hence, Qm larger than Qnc) for both
(3) and (9) to continue holding. Similar arguments apply for θ < θˆ.
This proposition opens up the possibility for an output-expanding collusion provided that θˆ
exists, i.e., θˆ ∈ [θ, θ], which will always be the case for C00f (·) suﬃciently small. More interesting,
the collusive agreement may include both output expansions (above Nash-Cournot levels) during
periods of higher demand (i.e., θ > θˆ) and output contractions during periods of lower demand.23
In providing more intuition for our results, it is useful to present the following result first
Proposition 2 Were the strategic and fringe firms competing in prices (with some product
diﬀerentiation), it would have been never optimal for the strategic firms to jointly price below
their (non-collusive) Nash-Betrand price levels.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that an output-expanding, or equivalently, a price-reducing
collusion, is only a possibility under quantity competition and never under price competition.
This observation, which is the central finding of the paper, can be understood as the balance of
two eﬀects that in price competition work in the same direction while in quantity competition
work in opposite directions. We can think of the first eﬀect as a static eﬀect. In a one-shot
simultaneous-move game the best collusive outcome for the group of large firms is the static
monopoly outcome of Section 3.1 which always have large firms reducing output (increasing
prices) below (above) their Nash-Cournot (-Bertrand) levels.24
The second eﬀect is a dynamic eﬀect that comes from the fact that in a repeated game the
group of large firms can use history-dependent strategies to credibly build commitment towards
the implementation of a better outcome than the one-shot simultaneous-move outcome.25 Un-
like the static eﬀect, the dynamic eﬀect works in opposite directions depending on the type
of competition and is because of the strategic sustitutability of quantities versus the strategic
complementarity of prices (see Bulow et al., 1985; and Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984).
23Note that had we adopted additive demand shocks, that is, P (θ,Q) = P (Q)+θ, the collusive aggrement would
have exhibited either output contractions or expansions throughout and depending on whether −(n− 1)C00f /P 0
is greater or lower than the unity.
24 It is true, as seen in Section 3.1., that when the demand shock is above certain level which we denote by θ˜ it
is optimal for large firms to remain at their Nash-Cournot levels. But it is useful for understanding Propositions
1 and 2 to keep in mind that if the large firms were to continue operating jointly beyond θ˜ the best outcome is
still to produce below their otherwise Nash-Cournot levels. In other words, the static eﬀect, as we define it, is
still present beyond θ˜, although diminishing.
25This is equivalent to the reputation eﬀect of Fudenberg and Levine (1989) for the case of a single (long-run)
player playing a simultaneous-move stage game against a sequence of short-run opponents (i.e., that play only
once).
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When firms compete in prices and large firms jointly lower (increase) their prices, fringe
firms’ equilibrium response is to lower (increase) theirs. Note from eq. (16) in the Appendix
that ∂pf (ps1, .., psn)/∂psi > 0 for all i, where pf and psi are, respectively, the prices charged
by fringe firms and strategic firm i. Knowing this, the dynamic eﬀect makes large firms to
price even higher relative to the static-monopoly outcome. On the other hand, when firms
compete in quantities and large firms jointly increase their productions, fringe firms’ equilibrium
response is not to increase their quantities but to reduce them (note from (8) that Q0f (Qs) =
θP 0(Qm)/[C 00f (Qmf )− θP 0(Qm)] < 0). The dynamic eﬀect now makes strategic firms to expand
their production taking advantage of fringe’s contracting response.26
Whether it is optimal for strategic firms (competing in quantities) to follow an output-
expanding collusion or not, at least for some levels of demand, will depend on whether the
dynamic eﬀect dominates the static eﬀect. The dynamic eﬀect is always present and possibly
increasing in θ while the static eﬀect diminishes with θ; hence, it is natural to think of some
demand level θˆ at which both eﬀects cancel out.
3.3 Market shares and output-expanding collusion
Proposition 1 opens up the possibility for an output-expanding collusion but does not say
much on the conditions under which this is likely to happen (i.e., on the existence of θˆ). For
that purpose, let us use the simplified version of our model, i.e., P (Q) = a − bQ, Cs(qs) = 0
and C 0f (Qf ) = cQf . From Proposition 1, the level of demand for which the optimal collusive
outcome coincides with the Nash-Cournot outcome is now θˆ = (n − 1)c/b.27 Consequently, a
collusive agreement among the strategic firms will lead to higher output (and, hence, to lower
prices) as long as θ > (n − 1)c/b; a condition that can be conveniently expressed in terms of
Cournot market shares as follows28
Qncf
Qnc >
n− 1
2n− 1 (11)
26To understand this further, think of a holding company that owns all of the large firms. The (Nash-Cournot)
outcome of the one-period simultaneous-move game between this holding company and the fringe is the static
monopoly outcome derived in Section 3.1 (note that there is no longer a θ˜ in that game). In a simultaneous-move
repeated game and where fringe firms observe all previous play the holding company can do strictly better by
committing to a larger (Stackelberg) quantity in all possible demand realizations (provided that the discount
factor is close enough to one).
27Note from Lemma 2 that θ˜ < θˆ which may call some readers’ attention. The reason is that the static eﬀect
is still present beyond θ˜ and is only at θˆ when is exactly oﬀset by the dynamic eﬀect.
28See footnote 11 for the values of Qncf and Qncs .
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When the fringe’s market share in the Nash-Cournot equilibrium is larger than (n−1)/(2n−1),
the group of strategic firms faces such a elastic (residual) demand that it is optimal for them
to coordinate in an output-expanding collusive agreement.
Since the fringe’s market share is increasing in θ and decreasing in c, condition (11) is more
likely to hold when the demand is large and the fringe is more eﬃcient (i.e., has low c). For
example, if n = 2 the collusive agreement will take the conventional output-contracting shape
only when the fringe’s market share is less than 1/3. More generally, any time the fringe’s
Cournot market share is above 1/2 the collusive agreement is to expand output above Cournot
levels regardless of the number of firms. These results have also implications for understanding
the shape that can take a collusive agreement among a subset of (heterogeneous) strategic
firms. The fewer the strategic firms taking part in the collusive agreement the more likely it
will contain at least some periods of (collusive) output expansion.
4 Collusion over the business cycle
We have characterized the maximal collusive agreement but said nothing on how diﬃcult is for
the strategic firms to sustain such an agreement under varying demand conditions. The question
of whether is more diﬃcult for firms to sustain collusion during booms than during recessions
(or vice versa) has received a great deal of attention in the literature after the pioneers works
of Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). Since our intention is not to
provide a discussion of how all existing results could change with the introduction of a (large)
fringe, we follow Rotemberg and Saloner’s (1986) in that demand is subject to (observable) i.i.d.
θ shocks. We also assume that all (strategic) firms use the same factor δ ∈ (0, 1) to discount
future profits.
For maximal collusion to be sustained throughout the business cycle it must hold for all θ
and for each strategic firm that the profits along the collusive path be equal or greater than the
profits from cheating on the collusive agreement and falling, thereafter, into the punishment
path, that is
πm(θ) + δV m ≥ πd(θ) + δV p (12)
where V m is the firm’s expected present value of profits along the collusive path, πd(θ) is the
profit obtained by the deviating firm in the period of deviation and V p is the firm’s expected
present value of profits along the punishment path. Although in principle the punishment path
13
can take diﬀerent forms (which may include return to collusion after some period of time),
reversion to Nash-Cournot appear to us as most reasonable, particularly because of the fringe
presence. Expression (12) adopts this view.29
It is important to notice that the direction of the deviation from the collusive agreement vary
along the business cycle. If the deviation occurs sometimes during the output-contracting phase
of the collusive agreement (i..e, when θ < θˆ), the optimal deviation is to increase output (i.e.,
move in the Nash-Cournot direction). But if deviation occurs sometimes during the output-
expanding phase (i..e, when θ > θˆ), the optimal deviation is to reduce output below the collusive
level. This invites us to speculate, at least in theory, about the possibility that a fringe firm
could sabotage one of the strategic firms’ production suﬃciently enough as to force the latter
to implement an (optimal) deviation and, hence, trigger a return to Nash-Cournot prices.30
We can now use (12) to obtain the discount factor function δ(θ) = (πd(θ)−πm(θ))/(V m−V p)
that establishes the minimum discount factor needed to sustain maximal collusion at θ provided
that maximal collusion is sustained at all other θ’s. Then, the critical demand level θc at
which becomes most diﬃcult for firms to sustain maximal collusion can be defined as θc =
argmaxθ δ(θ). In other words, firms can sustain maximal collusion throughout the business
cycle only if δ ≥ δ(θc).
For better illustration of θc, let us adopt, without much loss of generality, the previous
simplifying assumptions of linear demand and costs, which will allows us to obtain tractable
expressions for πd(θ) and πm(θ). Solving we obtain31
δ(θ) = θ[(n− 1)c− θb]
2
(c+ θb)2 K (13)
where K = a2/16n2b(V m − V p).
The function δ(θ) is plotted in Figure 1, which exhibits a local maximum at 0 < θ1 < θˆ and
a global minimum at θˆ –when maximal collusion reduces to the Nash-Cournot outcome. Note
that δ(θ) has been drawn without paying attention to the fact that the support of θ is some
subset [θ, θ] of <+. Despite both V m and V p depend on the actual support (and distribution)
29We also consider the optimal penal codes of Abreu (1986, 1988) and find no qualitative changes in our results.
30Obviously, the incentive for a strategic firm’s to sabotage the production of another strategic firm are always
smaller than the incentives to deviate from the collusive aggrement itself because the sabotage (regardless of
whether it is detected or not by the aﬀected firm) involves the simultaneous deviation of two firms which is
always less profitable than the deviation of a single firm.
31πd(θ) = θb[qd(θ)]2, where qd(θ) = a[c(n + 1) + θb]/4nb(c + θb) is the optimal deviation when each of the
remaining strategic firms are playing Qms /n.
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of θ, they enter as constant terms in (13), so changes in the support (and/or distribution) of θ
will only scale δ(θ) up or down with no eﬀects on the discussion that follows (e.g., θ1 and θ2
are independent of θ and θ).
Going back to Figure 1, if 1 > δ ≥ δ1 and θ ≤ θ2 firms will be able to sustain maximal
collusion throughout; otherwise there will be critical times at which less than maximal collusion
can be sustained. Depending on the values of θ and θ one can construct cases in which the
critical time is either at booms (e.g., [θ = 0, θ = θ1], [θ = θˆ, θ > θˆ]) or at recessions (e.g.,
[θ = θ1, θ = θˆ]). The latter example is most interesting because even if we restrict attention to
output-contracting collusion, that is, θ ≤ θˆ, we do not need invoke Green and Porter’s (1984)
imperfect monitoring to generate price wars at recessions.32 We summarize these findings in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Depending on the range of demand shocks and on the fringe’s costs, the time
at which is more diﬃcult for large firms to sustain maximal collusion can be either at booms or
recessions.
The above result is not restricted to our simplifying assumptions but entirely hinges on the
fact that there exists a demand level θˆ at which the collusive and the non-collusive outcomes
are indistinguishable, so collusion for any nearby θ is easily sustained. As we increase fringe’s
cost parameter c, θˆ moves to the right and eventually falls outside the support of θ. In the
limit, when c goes to infinity and, hence, the fringe’s market share goes to zero, we return to
Rotemberg and Saloner’ (1986) prediction that in the absence of fringe firms collusion is more
diﬃcult to sustain during booms (i.e., at the largest θ).33
5 Welfare: A numerical exercise
One of the main implications of our results is that the eﬀect of collusion on welfare is to be
signed on a case-by-case basis. If Herfindahl’s behavioral hypothesis is correct, the copper cartel
of 1935-39 had an unambiguous negative impact on welfare. But this is not necessarily so if one
believes the cartel was also able to sustain collusion during booms. To illustrate this possibility,
consider the following numerical exercise. Assume that the cartel was able to sustain maximal
32The Bagwell and Staiger’s (1997) model of serially correlated demand shocks is also able to generate price
wars at recessions for some parameter values.
33 limc→∞ δ(θ) = θ(n − 1)2K, where K = a2/16n2b(V m − V p) but Vm and V p correspond to the values of
no-fringe case.
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collusion in each of the six periods described in Table 1 and use the price and quantity data of
each of those periods to recover cost and demand parameters. Then, use these parameters to
predict what would have been the non-collusive equilibrium in each period.
In carrying out the exercise, we assume that (i) the five cartel members are identical, (ii)
the demand in period t = 1, ..., 6 is Pt(Qt, θt) = θt(a − bQt), (iii) the marginal cost function
of each of the cartel members is cstqγst, and (iv) the fringe’s marginal cost function is cftQδft.
The parameters to be estimated are θt, a, b, cst, γ, cft, δ. We have more parameters than
equilibrium equations so we are forced to make some (reasonable) arbitrary selections. We set
b = 0.7 to work with demand elasticity numbers around −0.35; similar to those in Agostini
(2005) and the studies cited therein. In addition, we set γ = δ = 0.4. We do not have a good
reason to diﬀerentiate between γ and δ and these numbers produce less variation among the
ckt’s (k = s, f), which we think should not vary much in a four-year time frame. Besides, lower
numbers (e.g., γ = δ = 0.1) produce the unreasonably scenario of output-expanding collusion
at all periods while higher numbers (e.g., γ = δ = 0.7) result not only in wide variation among
ckt’s but also in some negative cft’s. We also normalize the demand shocks to the apparently
largest shock, that is, θ3 = 1.
Results, which are merely for illustrative purposes and not aimed at testing hypothesis, are
reported in Table 2. The next three columns following the period column show demand and
costs parameters for the six periods.34 In the fifth, sixth and seventh columns we reproduce
the (assumed) maximal collusion levels of Table 1 (quantities are again at their annual rates)
to facilitate the comparison with the hypothetical Nash-Cournot levels of the following three
columns. As predicted by our theory, the non-collusive prices are lower during recessions (t =
1, 2, 4 and 6) but higher during booms (t = 1 and 5). Furthermore, the average non-collusive
price (weighted by the number of months in the period) is almost equal to the average collusive
price (10.3 vs. 10.4). Provided that collusion prices are less volatile and that a one cent oﬀ
during booms add more to consumer surplus than a one cent oﬀ during recessions, it may well
be that the copper cartel of 1935-39 did not have a negative impact on welfare but the opposite.
Obviously, this is just an hypothesis that has yet to be tested econometrically.
34Notice the variation of the cartel firms’ cost parameters (i.e., cs’s), particularly the low numbers in t = 3 and
5. Besides indicating that even lower numbers (i.e., higher variation) would have resulted had we assumed return
to Nash-Cournot during these two booms, it may be that these low numbers reflect an asymmetric expansion
with greater participation of lower cost firms.
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6 Final remarks
Following the structure of many commodity markets, we have studied the properties of a col-
lusive agreement when this is carried out only by the largest firms of the industry. We have
found that as the (non-collusive) market share of the noncartel firms increases relative to the
large firms’, it may be optimal for the latter to jointly produce above their non-collusive levels.
Consequently, we cannot rule out, at least in theory, the possibility of a welfare-enhancing col-
lusive agreement in which periods of output-contracting collusion are accompanied by periods
of output-expanding collusion.
We also found that due to the presence of a significant fraction of noncartel firms (i.e., fringe
firms), we do not need Green and Porter’s (1984) imperfect information to generate price wars
in recessions (i.e., procyclical pricing). More generally, it may be equally diﬃcult for large firms
to sustain maximal collusion during booms than during recessions. It would be, nevertheless,
interesting to extend the model to the case of imperfect information.
There are other theoretical extensions worth pursuing. So far we have assumed that large
firms have suﬃcient flexibility to expand production as needed. While this seems to be less
of a problem for the international copper cartel of 1935-39 thanks to the excess capacity left
by the 1929-33 world contraction,35 the introduction of capacity constraints is likely to aﬀect
the properties of the collusive agreement (Staiger and Wolak, 1992). One can go even further
and study altogether collusion in output and capacity (recall that in these markets firms are
constantly expanding their capacities to cope with depreciation and new demand). This surely
opens up the possibility for a capacity-expanding collusion even when firms set prices in the
spot market. In addition to capacity constraints, the opportunity of forward contracting part
of future production can also have implications for the collusive agreement (Liski and Montero,
2005).
Finally, it would be most interesting to carry out an empirical analysis of the copper cartel
of 1935-39 along the works of Porter (1983) and Ellison (1994) and test for periods of output-
expanding collusion. One important diﬀerence with these previous studies is that we not only
need to econometrically distinguish between regimes of (output-contracting) collusion and price
wars (i.e., return to Nash-Cournot) but perhaps more diﬃcult between regimes of output-
expanding collusion and price wars.
35 It would also be less of a problem if large firms manage, as in mineral markets, an in-house inventory to be
built up during recessions and withdrawn during booms.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a group of n strategic firms (i = 1, ..., n) and a competitive fringe consisting of
a continuum of firms (indexed by j) engaged in a simultaneous price-setting game of infinite
horizon. Strategic firms produce diﬀerentiated goods at the same cost Cs(qsi). Fringe firms
produce a homogenous good according to the aggregate marginal cost curve C 0f (Qf ) (as before,
a fringe firm’s unit-cost is denoted by cj). Strategic firm i’s demand is qsi ≡ Dsi(psi,p−si, pf ),
where p−si is the vector of prices charged by the remaining strategic firms and pf is the price
charged by all fringe firms (it should be clear that in equilibrium pf will be equal to the unit-
cost of the most expensive fringe firm that entered into production, that no fringe firm with a
unit-cost equal or lower than pf would want in equilibrium to charge anything diﬀerent than
this price, and that no firm with unit-cost higher than pf would want to charge lower than
pf ). Fringe aggregate demand is Qf = Df (pf ,ps), where ps = (ps1, ..., psn) is the vector of
prices charged by strategic firms. It is also known that ∂Dk/∂pk < 0, ∂Dk/∂p 6=k > 0, and
|∂Dk/∂pk| > |∂Dk/∂p6=k|.
The (non-collusive) Nash-Betrand equilibrium of the one-period game is obtained by simul-
taneously solving each firm’s problem
max
pi
Dsi(psi,p−si, pf )pi − Cs(Dsi(psi,p−si, pf )) for all i = 1, ..., n
pfj =



pf if cj ≤ pf
> pf if cj > pf
for all j
Then, the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium outcome is given by
Dsi(pnbsi , pnb−si, pnbf ) + [pnbsi −C 0s(Dsi)]
∂Dsi
∂psi
= 0 (14)
C 0f (Df (pnbf ,pnbs )) = pnbf
On the other hand, and following Section 3.2, the maximal collusive outcome for the strategic
firms is obtained by solving
max
ps1,...,psn
nX
i=1
{Dsi(psi,p−si, pf (ps))pi −Cs(Dsi(psi,p−si, pf (ps)))} (15)
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where pf (ps) is implicitly given by the fringe’s equilibrium response
C 0f (Df (pf ,ps)) = pf (16)
Using the latter, the first-order conditions associated to the optimal collusive outcome can,
after rearranging some terms, be written as
Dsi(pmi , pm−i, pmf ) +
nX
k=1
[pmsi − C 0s(Dsk)]
µ
∂Dsk
∂psi
+
∂Dsk
∂pf
∂pf
∂psi
¶
= 0 for all i = 1, ..., n (17)
and C 0f (Df (pmf ,pms )) = pmf .
Given that ∂pf/∂psi > 0, the diﬀerence between (17) and (14) is a stream of various positive
terms (those price eﬀects internalized in the collusive agreement); therefore, it is immediate
that Dsi(pmi , pm−i, pmf ) < Dsi(pnbi , pnb−i, pnbf ) for all i = 1, ..., n, and with that, Df (pmf ,pms ) <
Df (pnbf ,pnbs ). Note that in the Hotelling example of the introduction, the strategic firms do not
directly face each other, so ∂Ds1/∂ps2 = ∂Ds2/∂ps1 = 0.
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Table 1. Evolution of the copper cartel of 1935-1939 
  Cartel production    Noncartel production London spot price     
 
 
Period 
 
Quota 
status 
Production 
(annual 
rate) 
Per cent 
change from 
preceding 
period 
Production 
(annual 
rate) 
Per cent 
change from 
preceding 
period 
Cents 
per 
pound 
Per cent 
change from 
preceding 
period 
1. July—Dec. 1935 Quotas 559  408  8.2  
2. Jan.—Dec. 1936 Quotas 598 +7.0% 368 -9.8% 9.5 +16% 
3. Jan.—Nov. 1937 No Quotas 917 +53.4 439 +19.3 13.4 +41 
4. Dec. 1937—Sept. 1938 Quotas 762 -16.9 481 +9.6 9.7 -28 
5. Oct. 1938—Dec. 1938 No Quotas 948 +24.4 504 +4.8 10.6 +9 
6. Jan. 1939—July 1939 Quotas 736 -22.4 511 +1.4 10.0 -6 
Source: Table 3 of Herfindahl (1959, p. 115) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Collusive and non-collusive equilibria for the copper cartel of 1935-39 
t θ cs cf Qsm Qfm Pm Qsnc Qfnc Pnc 
1 0.23 2.19 2.00 559 408 8.2 679 337 7.6 
2 0.27 2.31 2.41 598 368 9.5 739 290 8.6 
3 1.00 1.44 3.16 917 439 13.4 847 498 14.0 
4 0.49 1.75 2.22 762 481 9.7 798 457 9.5 
5 1.36 1.12 2.38 948 504 10.6 624 800 12.8 
6 0.51 2.02 2.22 736 511 10.0 743 508 9.9 
Note: a = 92.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Critical time for maximal collusion 
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